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Abstract
Field experiments have shown that observing other people littering, stealing or lying can trigger own misconduct, leading
to a decay of social order. However, a large extent of norm violations goes undetected. Hence, the direction of the dynamics
crucially depends on actors’ beliefs regarding undetected transgressions. Because undetected transgressions are hardly
measureable in the field, a laboratory experiment was developed, where the complete prevalence of norm violations,
subjective beliefs about them, and their behavioral dynamics is measurable. In the experiment, subjects could lie about their
monetary payoffs, estimate the extent of liars in their group and make subsequent lies contingent on information about
other people’s lies. Results show that informed people who underestimate others’ lying increase own lying more than twice
and those who overestimate, decrease it by more than half compared to people without information about others’ lies. This
substantial interaction puts previous results into perspective, showing that information about others’ transgressions can
trigger dynamics in both directions: the spreading of normative decay and restoring of norm adherence.
Citation: Rauhut H (2013) Beliefs about Lying and Spreading of Dishonesty: Undetected Lies and Their Constructive and Destructive Social Dynamics in Dice
Experiments. PLoS ONE 8(11): e77878. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0077878
Editor: Matjaz Perc, University of Maribor, Slovenia
Received July 19, 2013; Accepted September 9, 2013; Published November 13, 2013
Copyright:  2013 Heiko Rauhut. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits
unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.
Funding: This work was supported by ETH Zurich, Swiss Federal Institute of Technology. The funders had no role in study design, data collection and analysis,
decision to publish, or preparation of the manuscript.
Competing Interests: The author has declared that no competing interests exist.
* E-mail: heiko.rauhut@uzh.ch
Introduction
Publicly visible norm violations may subsequently trigger more
norm violations and eventually set off dynamics of normative
decay and disorder. This dynamics has recently been tested in a
series of field experiments where graffiti, litter, unreturned
shopping carts, and illegal parking caused people to violate the
same and even other norms [1]. Similarly, it has been shown that
people litter if they observe others littering [2], and people lie more
if they observe others lying [3,4]. The contagiousness of disorder
tends to be particularly strong if there is nobody around giving
cues that show respect for social order [5].
This dynamics may be explained by a mechanism linking the
perceived prevalence of a certain behavior with subjective beliefs
about its common approval. People hold beliefs about the average
behavior, i.e., about the ‘‘descriptive norm’’, and make inferences
about its appropriateness, i.e., about the ‘‘injunctive norm’’ [6]. In
this way, occurrences of public norm violations may make people
aware of a larger than initially believed prevalence of the behavior,
trigger reassessments of its common approval and result in an
amplification of disorder and normative decay.
However, many norm violations are not publicly visible but
conducted in private. Two-timing, tax evasion, consumption of
pornography, visits to prostitutes or alcohol abuse are only some of
many examples where norm violations are typically concealed
from others; consequently, large parts remain in the dark.
Therefore, the complete rate of norm violations consists of
detected and undetected norm violations. Hence, normative
dynamics and normative decay are crucially dependent on actors’
subjective beliefs about the rate of undetected norm violations. If
actors perceive others’ norm violations, their beliefs about the
additional extent of undetected norm violations are crucial for
their evaluation of the appropriateness of the behavior and their
own decision to adhere or violate the norm.
If actors underestimate the complete extent of norm violations,
the proposed dynamics of the above mentioned authors hold if
certain conditions are met [7]. Those underestimating others’
transgressions may perceive occurrences of others’ norm violations
as relatively frequent or strong if they are informed about the true
extent of norm violations. As a consequence, they increase their
subjective estimates about the extent of norm violations and
subsequently perform more own norm violations. In a classic
paper [8] sociologist Heinrich Popitz already outlined this idea of a
‘‘preventive effect of ignorance’’. That means that an actor’s
ignorance of other peoples’ norm violations has a deterrent effect
on his or her norm-related behavior. Lifting the ‘veil of ignorance’
is expected to increase the extent of norm violations. An example
is the Kinsey report [9] on sexual behavior. The publication of the
report at that time had the consequence of changing sexual
behaviors and norms of sexual conduct [4,7,10]. Of course,
information on the true amount of norm violations does not always
lead to an upward spiral of transgressions [7]. First, and almost
trivially, potential transgressors do not always gain from norm
violations. Secondly, the disclosure of norm violations is often
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paralleled by increasing sanctions, stigmatization and strengthen-
ing of the legitimation of the norm as in the case of child abuse by
catholic priests [7]. Hence, adjustment of an actor’s underestima-
tion of transgressions does not necessarily lead to an increase in his
or her own propensity to violate the norm.
So far we have assumed that actors underestimate the amount
of other peoples’ transgressions. However, what will happen to
those who overestimate from the start? Will the dynamics be
inverted? Will those who believe more transgressions are being
committed than de facto adjust their beliefs and violate fewer
norms if they hear about the true state of the world? If this
consequence were true, the dynamics will crucially depend on
actors’ subjective beliefs. My research question therefore asks
whether information about others’ norm violations will increase
transgressions in societies consisting predominantly of believers in
too few transgressions and decreasing ones in those with believers
in too many. The conjecture that beliefs about the underestima-
tion or overestimation of others’ norm violations are crucial for
determining whether the dynamics set off more or fewer norm
violations has been raised consecutively in [11,12,4,7].
The conjecture about the interaction between beliefs and
behavior is supported by evidence showing that over- as well as
underperformance of norm-relevant behaviors is regarded as
deviant. Hence, information about norm violations of others can
trigger adjustments in both directions – more or less adherence to
social norms. Taking the example of norms of environmental
protection, people were informed whether their energy consump-
tion level was above or below the average of their neighborhood.
Those above the average reduced their energy consumption;
however, those below increased it when there was no special
mention of their laudable behavior [11].
Whereas norms of energy consumption are one of the few
examples where prevalence is directly measurable, the actual
extent of most norm violations is unknown to both the researcher
and the people in the field making their choices for pro- or
antisocial behaviors. Therefore, I developed an experimental
design where the prevalence of norm violations can be observed,
the accuracy of beliefs measured and the offsetting dynamics of
pro- and antisocial behaviors traced. This allows the understand-
ing of the dynamics between objective information, subjective
beliefs and the co-evolution of social norms.
Experimental Design
The dice experiment [13] was used, as in a previous experiment
[4], to study the spread of norm violations. This follow-up study of
[4] has been extended by introducing the measurement of beliefs
about the extent of others’ norm violations. This experimental
setup allowed subjects to violate the honesty norm under highly
anonymous conditions. In the experiment, subjects performed
multiple dice casts in separate booths where they were isolated
from others and unable to be observed (see Fig. S1 for
experimental instructions). They entered their cast numbers into
a tailor-made graphical computer interface and received Swiss
Francs according to the number they reported (Fig. S2). The
reported number six was an exception and yielded no earnings.
This design put subjects with numbers ‘‘six’’ and numbers lower
than ‘‘five’’ into a moral conflict between either adhering to the
honesty norm or increasing own payoffs by reporting higher
payoffs than they would be entitled to.
This design is an improvement to previous designs in that it
avoids deception of subjects. This enhances subjects’ trust in the
experimenter and serious completion of the experimental task. A
truthful and straightforward description of the experimental
protocol ensures that honest reports can be regarded as subjects’
willingness to pay a price for honesty. This is a design
improvement compared to experiments where subjects are
deceived by predetermined dice cast by manipulated computer
programs [14]. If subjects think they are being deceived by the
experimenter, they may reciprocate deception and act dishonestly
in response to the experimenter’s dishonesty. This would bias the
results and render inconclusive results.
The sample consisted of 240 subjects, subdivided into 24
experimental sessions of groups of ten. In each period each subject
cast a die twelve times and reported each number. There was one
trial period and four periods with payments where one cast was
randomly selected for payouts. Subjects were randomly allocated
to one of three treatments. In the ‘‘info treatment’’, subjects were
informed about the frequency of each reported payoff (zero, one,
two, three, four, and five) in their group. In addition, beliefs were
elicited by asking for estimates of these frequencies before
information feedback (Fig. S3, S4). Belief accuracy was incenti-
vized with monetary payments for good estimates using a
quadratic scoring rule (see Table S1 and Materials and Methods
for details).
There were two control treatments. The ‘‘control belief’’
treatment consisted of belief elicitation without information
feedback. The ‘‘control base’’ treatment was without belief
elicitation and without information feedback. Note that the
honesty threshold in this design is such that each number is
reported twice and average reported payments are 2.5 Swiss
Francs per round. Lying is measureable as upward deviance from
this honesty threshold in terms of higher average claimed
payments and higher frequencies of high reported dots (i.e., fives).
To the best of my knowledge, this is a novel design to measure
subjects’ beliefs about others’ honesty in dice experiments. This
improves previous dice designs where the contagiousness of lying
was measured without controlling for subjective beliefs about
others’ honesty [4]. In [4] it was observed that subjects who were
informed about others’ lies increased their own propensity to lie
compared to a control condition without information feedback.
This main effect could, however, not be separated for those
underestimating and those overestimating others’ dishonesty. The
novel belief measures allow observing the interaction between
information feedback and beliefs and can therefore contribute to
the existing literature. In this way the research question whether
believers in too little honesty will increase and those in too much
decrease their own propensity for honest dice reports can be
answered.
The implementation of multiple dice casts per subjects in each
round was mainly done for two reasons. The first reason was to
improve the measurement of beliefs. The elicitation of beliefs
requires subjects to estimate the distribution of dice reports in their
group. If there are too few dice casts to be estimated, the
distribution becomes very noisy and subjects will not make as
much effort in generating good estimates. Hence, elicitation of
meaningful beliefs requires robust distributions to be estimated.
The repetitions in the form of twelve dice casts per round yield a
distribution consisting of twelve casts for each of the nine other
group members, totaling in 108 dice casts from other group
members per round. Accordingly, the distribution to be estimated
by each subject is relatively robust. The second argument for
introducing multiple dice casts per round was to ensure robust
information feedback. If information feedback is driven by too
much random noise, it does not give enough information about
the lying behavior of others in the group. Consequently, too few
dice casts per round in each group hinder studying time trends in
lying over the four rounds of the experiment.
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With respect to introducing multiple dice casts per subject, it
obviously needs a good compromise between guaranteeing enough
robustness for eliciting meaningful beliefs and meaningful infor-
mation feedback on the one hand and allowing for enough
randomness for ensuring anonymity for lying on the other hand.
This compromise is critical since to cast high numbers twelve times
is far more unlikely than it is to throw a high number once. As a
result, the identification of liars on the individual level becomes
easier the more repetitions there are. All in all, I believe that the
choice of twelve repetitions per round in groups of ten subjects
represents a good compromise between robustness and anonymity.
Results
Figure 1 shows the main results. The upper panels (A–C) show
the trend in mean payment claims. The lower panels (D–F) display
the number of reported fives over the four payment periods. The
left column (panels A and D) shows the general trend for all types
subdivided into info (solid black line), control belief (dotted red
line) and the control base treatment (dashed green line). The x-
axes in the upper panels depict the treatment averages of subjects’
average reported payment claims per round. The ‘‘honesty
threshold’’ of 2.5 (
P5
i~0 xi
.
6) is denoted by the dashed horizontal
black lines. The x-axes in the lower panels depict the treatment
averages of subjects’ numbers of reported fives per round. The five
was taken, because this is the highest possible payout per cast.
Here, the ‘‘honesty threshold’’ of two (12?1/6) is also denoted by a
dashed horizontal black line.
First of all, there is substantial lying in all three treatments. This
demonstrates the usefulness of the dice experiment for studying
violations of the honesty norm. With respect to mean claimed
payments (panel A), people claim on average about 35% more
than what they are entitled to: the average claim is about 3.3 CHF
per period compared to the honesty threshold of 2.5 CHF. With
respect to the number of claimed fives (panel D), people claim
about 230% more than what they are entitled to: on average, there
are more than four claimed ‘‘fives’’ compared to the honesty
threshold of two. All deviances from honesty are highly significant
at the 0.1% level. This is shown by confidence intervals of 99.9%
of differences between dice reports and honesty thresholds in Fig.
S5 in the appendix.
In a first step, the main effect of information feedback was
estimated (panel A and D). This was done by computing the trends
in dishonesty over the four periods regardless of beliefs about
others’ honesty. This analysis can be regarded as a replication of
[4] with more data per subject. In [4] the authors used one dice
report per subject before and one after information feedback. The
present study uses twelve dice reports before information feedback
and three times twelve dice reports after information feedback, i.e.,
considering three periods with twelve reports each.
Fig. 1A shows the main effect of information feedback for all
subjects (i.e., regardless of their beliefs) in terms of reported means
and Fig. 1D, in terms of reported fives. It can be seen that subjects
lie slightly more in subsequent periods if they are informed about
others’ reported payment claims. In the information treatment,
subjects claim roughly between 0.10 and 0.14 higher average
payouts and between 0.1 and 0.4 more fives compared to the
Figure 1. Trend of reported payment claims in means (panels A–C) and fives (panels D–F). Error bars show adjusted 95% confidence
intervals such that non-overlapping intervals refer to treatment differences with p#5% (see Materials and methods for calculations of adjustments).
Underestimators hold beliefs below and overestimators above reported claims in their group at respective periods.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0077878.g001
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control treatments. However, these differences are statistically not
significantly different from both control treatments (Table S2).
This means that the main ‘‘broken windows effect’’ in this study
for all types of people is weak. Information of others’ transgressions
triggers actors to increase their own transgressions only modestly.
The direction of the effect is similar as in [4] and can be replicated.
Yet, the magnitude of the effect is statistically weaker than in [4].
Other recent lab and online experiments yield a similar result of a
small and non-significant increase of cheating in the feedback
group as reported in [15].
However, what happens if beliefs about others’ dishonesty are
taken into account? Will believers in too little dishonesty of others
increase their own dishonesty and will believers in too much
reduce it? If this were the case, the main effect would conceal the
underlying dynamics in panels A and D because it works in the
opposite direction for under- and overestimators of others’
dishonesty. Therefore, in a second step, the trends in dishonesty
were calculated separately for those believing in too little and those
in too much dishonesty of others. Since beliefs were not measured
in the control base treatment, trends are only separated between
control belief and info treatments.
Panels B, C, E and F of Fig. 1 show the results when types are
differentiated by under- and overestimators. It can be seen that the
results change substantially, confirming the interaction effect very
clearly. ‘‘Underestimators’’ are defined such that they hold beliefs
below and ‘‘overestimators’’ above reported payment claims in
their group at respective periods. Per round with twelve dice casts,
underestimators in periods after information feedback report 0.44
CHF more in average payments than underestimators in the
control belief treatment (Fig. 1B, Table 1A). With respect to the
number of reported fives, underestimators in the info treatment
report 1.3 more fives than underestimators in the control belief
treatment (Fig. 1E, Tab. 1B). Both interactions are highly
significant at the 0.1% level.
The same interaction holds for overestimators. Actors overes-
timating the extent of lying subsequently adjust their reports
downwards compared to the control belief treatment. Per round
with twelve dice casts, overestimators in periods after information
feedback claim 0.72 CHF less in average payments than over-
estimators in the control belief treatment (Fig. 1C, Table 1A). With
respect to the number of reported fives, overestimators claim 3.5
fewer fives in the info condition compared to overestimators in the
control belief condition (Fig. 1E, Table 1B). Both reductions are
statistically significant at the 0.1% level. The differences between
info and control belief treatments for over- and underestimators
are substantial, taking into account that honest subjects would
report an average of 2.5 Swiss Francs per period and two
occurrences of the highest payout ‘‘five’’.
Note that the discussed percentage comparisons refer to the
average effects over periods 2 to 4, where information feedback
was given in the info treatment and withheld in the control belief
treatment. The reported percentages in the text can be computed
from Table 1. This is done by referring to the intercept as baseline,
which represents the mean claimed payments (model A) or
average number of reported fives (model B) for overestimators in
the control belief treatment. The percentages for the other three
groups can be calculated by taking the differences from the
baseline with respect to main and interaction effects.
Another way of quantifying the strength of the interaction is to
compare the proportion of liars in different treatments. One way
of doing this is to compute the expected proportion of the highest
payoff five of a fair die (which is 1/6), compare it to the empirically
reported proportion of fives p and adjust it for liars who actually
threw a five but would have lied in case of lower cast numbers (i.e.,
multiply by 6/5). This yields an estimate of the proportion of liars
l= (p21/6)?6/5 (see also [13]). The proportion of reported fives
for over- and underestimators in the information and control belief
treatments can be calculated from Table 1.
The proportion of liars in the population of underestimators is
more than twice as large in the info as in the control treatment:
there are 25.6% underestimating liars in the info and 12.7%
underestimating liars in the control treatment. Note that these
percentages refer again to periods 2 to 4, demonstrating that
underestimators increase their lying if they are informed about the
extent of lying in their group. Moreover, the proportion of liars in
the population of overestimators decreases by less than half if they
are informed about the extent of liars in their group. There are
56.3% overestimating liars in the control condition and 21.8%
overestimating liars in the info treatment.
This shows that lying can either be more than halved or more
than doubled depending on subjective beliefs and whether
information feedback is provided. This clearly demonstrates that
the observed interaction is substantial and gives rise to the
conclusion that the direction of the dynamics towards either decay
or stabilization of social order is strongly contingent on actors’
subjective beliefs regarding the extent of norm violations in the
population. Furthermore, it can be noted that the dynamics
become stronger over time in the sense that treatment differences
increase over time (Fig. 1), giving additional weight to the
conclusion.
Discussion
The reported results put recent findings about normative
dynamics into perspective. Information about norm violations of
others does not per se trigger subsequently more norm violations.
The mechanism is contingent on actors’ subjective beliefs. Since
some norm violations are visible and others go undetected, the
Table 1. Linear regression models of treatment differences
between info and belief control treatments.
(A) (B)
means fives
info 20.715*** 23.454**
(23.72) (23.30)
underestimator types 21.114*** 24.362***
(26.39) (24.51)
info6underestimator
types
1.156*** 4.741***
(5.19) (4.31)
intercept 4.118*** 7.630***
(25.47) (8.18)
N 480 480
Model A shows differences in claimed mean payments and model B differences
in claimed number of fives with respect to under- and overestimators and their
treatment interactions. One case refers to the reported mean (model A) or
reported number of fives (model B) over the sequence of twelve dice casts per
period per subject (yielding a total of N= 480 cases for each model). Only
periods 2, 3 and 4 are used because these are the periods after information
feedback in the info treatment. Robust standard errors are used, which were
clustered for subjects. T statistics are reported in parentheses, stars denote
statistical significance with *p,0.05, **p,0.01, ***p,0.001.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0077878.t001
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dynamics depends on whether actors under- or overestimate the
complete rate of norm violations.
If most subjects begin by underestimating transgression of
others, it is likely to be a sign that they are normatively oriented in
the beginning and project this normative orientation onto others.
If they do not hear otherwise, they stick to this belief. Nonetheless,
if they hear that they underestimate, they will adjust upward, norm
violations will spread in the system, they may become less
normatively oriented and adjust subsequently, triggering norma-
tive decay up to a society mainly consisting of liars. However, the
reversed process is likely for subjects who overestimate from the
beginning. They are likely to project that others are also not
normatively oriented and stick to that if they do not hear
otherwise. If they are informed, and as a result hear otherwise,
they scale down their beliefs about cheating to a substantial
degree. As a consequence, the honesty norm gains support, and
honesty may spread up to a society mainly consisting of moralists.
The experimental findings discard the alternative explanation
that the norm-stabilizing effect of underestimating transgressions is
solely due to a sanctioning mechanism. It has been argued that this
effect occurs because information about others’ norm violations
serves as clue to the likelihood or severity of sanctions to be
expected [3]. In this line of reasoning, underestimators adjust their
beliefs about the probability or severity of sanctions after having
learnt about the true prevalence of norm violations. Consequently,
underestimators interpret others’ norm violations as an indication
that sanctions are less likely or less severe than they originally
thought – and increase their own transgressions. This mechanism
explains the effect of information about others’ transgressions on
increased own transgressions as a selfish, forward-looking reaction
of underestimators on their updated beliefs about sanctions. Yet, in
the experimental design sanctions have been completely excluded
because individual norm violations have not been observable by
the experimenters. Therefore, it can be concluded that there is a
‘pure’ effect of the spread of norm violations that is not generated
by a change in the perception of sanctions.
The presented interaction between actions and beliefs for the
case of lying also provides novel insights for the basic debate about
their general interrelation. There is a lively literature on the
temporal order of the two – do beliefs determine behavior or does
behavior determine beliefs? The first line of reasoning is often
advocated by economists and may be called reaction theory, the
second one, advocated by psychologists, projection theory [16]. In
social dilemmas, reaction theory refers to conditional cooperation.
In this line of reasoning, cooperative behavior is a reaction on the
actor’s belief that at least a certain fraction of the population will
cooperate. It has been shown, for example, that a substantial
proportion of actors condition their degree of cooperativeness on
their belief that enough others also cooperate [17] and discontinue
cooperation if they are informed about a critical fraction of
freeriders [18]. Projection theory argues for a reversed causal path:
actors project their own cooperative (or non-cooperative) inten-
tions onto others and expect them to be similar to themselves
[19,20]. In this way, cooperative intentions trigger an alignment
between cooperative behavior and cooperative beliefs so that
beliefs may rather be the consequence of post-hoc rationalizations
of behavior than its origin [21].
The data suggests a combination of reaction and projection
mechanisms. Subjects without information feedback show a
constant lying pattern, which is strongly correlated with their
beliefs. Underestimators start with comparably few lies and seem
to project their lying behavior onto the lying behavior of others
since they retain their honesty level throughout the game.
Conversely, overestimators start with comparably many lies and
also seem to project their lying behavior onto others, retaining
their dishonesty level. The dynamics in the treatment with
information feedback, however, supports reaction theory. In-
formed underestimators react on their updated belief and adjust
their lying behavior upwards. Similarly, informed overestimators
react on their updated belief and adjust downwards. This
combined mechanism of projection and reaction has also been
supported in a recent study on cooperation in an asymmetric social
dilemma [22] and it is likely to have played a role in field
experiments on broken windows [1,5].
Furthermore, the study sheds a novel light on the debate about
peer effects in social dilemmas. It is often argued that peer effects
are biased towards people’s self-interest, triggering asymmetric
peer effects in social dilemmas. For example, people often exhibit a
self-serving bias in their perception of their own cooperativeness
[23] and are more averse towards envy than guilt [24]. In a novel
study, the possible confounding between peer effects and strategic
incentives in earlier studies has been ruled out by design [22]. The
authors show in the context of a gift-exchange game that agents
revise their level of reciprocity between the principal’s offered
wage and their returned effort contingent on information about
another unrelated agent’s effort. These peer effects are shown to
be strongly asymmetric: Agents only make downward adjustments
which are in their own self-interest and do not increase their effort
if the other agent has shown higher effort compared to their own.
In contrast, my study does not reveal such an asymmetry with
predominantly self-interested adjustments. Honesty revisions occur
in both directions – actors exhibit more but also less lying after
information feedback, based on whether they under- or overes-
timated the extent of lying in the population.
One may reason whether the above discussed symmetry of self-
serving and self-harming honesty adjustments may be caused by
the monetary incentives for correct beliefs. There is evidence that
the measurement of incentivized beliefs can have consequences for
the measurement of cooperative behavior. If people receive money
for accurate beliefs, they behave more cooperatively compared to
setups without such premiums [25]. One explanation for this may
be that subjects aim for a specific minimum payment as their final
earnings for participating in the experiment. Hence, subjects
without monetary compensation for accurate beliefs may com-
pensate this relative ‘‘mental’’ loss by more freeriding in order to
increase their earnings. However, if this were true for my setup,
compared to a version without incentivizing beliefs, there would be
higher honesty levels for both kinds of subjects, over- and
underestimators. Therefore, this argument does not explain why
overestimators decrease their lying about as much as under-
estimators increase theirs. In addition, it has been shown that
monetary incentives for beliefs increase belief accuracy [25]. A
likely reason is that subjects take belief elicitations more seriously
when getting paid for accuracy. Hence, incentivized beliefs yield
more accurate belief measures and thus have more predictive
power. This gives more weight to the conclusion that information
feedback in my study yields behavioral adjustments in both
directions – more and less honesty. Subsequent studies should
explore this issue in more detail and also investigate whether the
kind of dilemma may explain the differences between both studies.
The group sizes of under- and overestimators in the analysis
deserve some further discussion. The fraction of under- and
overestimators varies over time and experimental conditions;
however, it is always sufficiently large for robust estimations. Over
all, there are more under- than overestimators, and the fraction of
underestimators varies between 44% and 89%. Initially, most
subjects underestimate the extent of norm violations. With respect
to reported means, there are 70% underestimators in the info and
Beliefs about Lying and Spreading of Dishonesty
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73% in the control belief condition. Similarly, there are 83% initial
underestimators of reported fives in both conditions. Over time,
the fraction of underestimators decreases in the info condition,
whereas it remains at a roughly constant level between 72% and
84% in the belief control condition. Detailed time trends of the
fraction of under- and overestimators and respective confidence
intervals are given in the (Fig. S6).
The causal interpretation of the differential effects for under-
and overestimators deserves some caution, however. It has to be
noted that the groups are determined by subjects’ behaviors during
the course of the lying experiment and not via random assignment.
Hence, it cannot be ruled out that effects of third, unmeasured
variables may mitigate some of the observed dynamics. Never-
theless, it seems hardly feasible to use random assignment instead
since it is not possible to assign subjective beliefs externally.
Furthermore, it can be doubted that such strong and straightfor-
ward interactions as presented here may be completely driven by
other, unmeasured mechanisms.
In summary, the findings show that it is important to take
subjective beliefs about undetected norm violations of others into
account. Such beliefs can serve as strong mediators for disorder
effects on norm conformity. The projection of own norm
violations on others and their offsetting dynamics into both
normative decay and norm conformity with respect to beliefs
deserves further study.
Materials and Methods
Experimental Design
The experiment was conducted as follows: Subjects were
recruited from the address pool of the DeSciL laboratory at
ETH Zurich, consisting of students from all disciplines from ETH
and the University of Zurich. Subjects were invited in groups of
ten and received 5 CHF show-up fee. The experiment consisted of
24 sessions with ten subjects per session. Subjects were first
informed about the general instructions of the experiment before
the actual experiment started (see Fig. S1 for paper instructions
and exact wording). Each subject was assigned an isolated cubicle
where nobody could observe subjects’ actions. All subjects started
after all were finished reading the paper instructions. All subjects
completed each round of dice casts in parallel.
In each session, each of the ten subjects per group was randomly
allocated to one of three treatments, yielding an allocation of 3-3-4
in each treatment, with random variations of group sizes per
treatment in each session. It was ensured that there was an equal
division of 80 subjects per treatment over all sessions.
In each round, each subjects had to report twelve dice casts
using a computer interface (Fig. S2 displays exact wordings and
graphical animations). Note that subjects were allowed to perform
additional casts to verify that the die was working properly. It was
pointed out that only the first twelve casts ‘‘count’’ as payments.
This procedure was implemented to enhance subjects’ trust in not
being deceived by the experimenter and to generate higher levels
of lying and with it more explanatory power due to larger
variance. The latter argument is based on previous dice
experiments, where subjects were more comfortable to report
‘‘delayed’’ higher casts than invented higher casts [26].
There was one trial period without payments and four rounds of
dice casts with payments. In the payment-relevant rounds, one
reported dice cast was randomly selected for payouts. This was
common knowledge (see paper instructions Fig. S1).
Subjects were asked about their beliefs in the info and in the
control belief treatments in the following way (Fig. S3 shows exact
wordings and graphical animations). Subjects had to estimate the
number of reported payoffs for each reported dot. Thus, six
numbers were elicited from each subject: the number of reported
payoffs of zero, one, two, three, four, and five. The elicitation of
beliefs was incentive compatible using a similar logic to the
quadratic scoring rule [27]. The difference between each of the six
estimated payoff reports and the actual number in the session was
computed. A perfect guess yielded a payoff of 0.80 Swiss Francs
(CHF), an absolute difference of 1 yielded 0.75 CHF, an absolute
difference of 2 yielded 0.60 CHF, a difference of 3 yielded 0.35
CHF and a difference equal or larger than 4 yielded zero CHF (see
Table S2).
The logic behind this is that each squared deviation is multiplied
with 5 and subtracted from the best payoff of 0.80 CHF. The
payoff p is computed as p~
P5
k~0 a{b(Ek{Rk)
2: Here the best
payoff is a. This payoff is reduced with differences between the
estimate Ek for the reported dot k and the real value Rk. This
difference is scaled with b. Note that only positive payoffs were
paid out and negative ones truncated and transformed to zero. In
the experiment, a=80 and b=5, yielding the payouts from Table
S1.
In the information treatment, subjects were informed about the
number of reported payoffs for each reported dot of the nine other
subjects in their group (see Fig. S4 for exact wording and graphical
animations). They were informed about their own estimates and
these were compared with the actual frequencies. In the control
belief treatment, subjects also estimated the number of reported
payoffs of the other participants of their group. Also in the control
belief treatment, subjects received money for belief accuracy at the
end of the experiment; however, they did not receive information
feedback. There was no measurement of beliefs and no
information feedback in the control base treatment.
Duration and Average Payouts of the Experiment
The experimental sessions lasted twenty-four minutes on
average. Subjects received on average 26 CHF, consisting of 21
CHF for payouts from decisions and 5 CHF show-up fee. The
payoffs ranged between 15 and 42 CHF. More specifically,
average payments for dice casts were 13 CHF, ranging from 4 to
20 CHF. Beliefs yielded 6 CHF on average, ranging from 0 to 12
CHF.
Calculation of Adjusted Confidence Intervals
Error bars in Figure 1 show adjusted 95% confidence intervals
such that non-overlapping intervals refer to treatment differences
with p#5%. The reason for the adjustment is that the Figure is
constructed such that non-overlapping confidence intervals refer
to hypotheses tests with an error rate of 5%. Since the error rate of
two non-overlapping standard 95% confidence intervals is smaller
than 5%, yielding a too conservative test, confidence intervals are
adjusted in order to represent hypothesis tests of differences in
means at a 5% error rate [28,29].
The confidence intervals are adjusted such that the type I error
rate when comparing the overlap of 100(1-c)% is
2PR½Zvzc=2(1zk)=
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
1zk2
p , with k as the ratio of standard
errors, Z as the normal variate and c as the value of the adjusted
confidence interval. For example, if the standard errors for two
means are equal (k = 1), this yields c=0.166, meaning that non-
overlapping 83% confidence intervals represent significantly
different means with a 5% error rate. The larger the ratio of
standard errors, the larger the adjusted confidence level (e.g., a
ratio of k = 5 yields adjusted 90% confidence intervals referring to
a 5% error rate).
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For Figure 1, the ratios of standard errors of the means in the
info and the control belief treatments were computed and
respective adjusted confidence levels were calculated using self-
developed Stata code. Note that in Panels A and D, with three
comparisons of means, the largest ratio of standard errors was
used. The calculated standard errors in Figure 1 range from
84.0% to 86.0% confidence intervals, which all reflect hypothesis
tests with a 5% error rate.
Ethics Statement
Participants of the laboratory experiment were recruited from
the address pool of the ETHZ Decision Science Laboratory at
ETH Zurich (hereafter DeSciL). The address pool consists of
students from all disciplines from ETH and the University of
Zurich. The experiment fully adhered to the Operational Rules of
DeSciL. The Operational Rules are public and are published
online at the link given in reference [30]. Subjects were recruited
by e-mail and were informed that the experiment would take place
at DeSciL and hence adhered to the Operational Rules of DeSciL.
The experiment adhered to the rule of no deception, a rule that
is standard in experimental economics and is becoming standard
in experimental sociology. This means that subjects were in no
way deceived or lied to, and all instructions truthfully described all
procedures of the experiment. This is stated clearly in the
Operational Rules (p. 3): ‘‘Deception of research participants is
strictly forbidden in the DeSciL. Under no circumstances will
participants be lied to or deceived by researchers in any way,
before, during, or after the course of a research session. The
DeSciL is very concerned about developing and maintaining an
unblemished reputation among the research population for
transparency and perfect honesty. This rule of no deception
applies to the recruitment process, the instructions provided
during the experimental sessions, the experimental process and
feedback during the research, and the economic compensation
participants receive for taking part in the experiment’’.
Before the experiment, participants were informed about the
monetary compensation for their participation and performance in
the experiment. This reflects the Operational Rules as follows (p.
4): ‘‘All research participants will be compensated for their time
and efforts when taking part in research. A show up payment is
guaranteed to all participants who sign up for a particular study
and show up to the laboratory on time’’. Monetary incentives were
used to ensure thoughtful and careful decisions (p. 4): ‘‘Experi-
ments should be conducted in such a way that behavior is
incentive compatible. Careful and thoughtful decision making
should be encouraged and remunerated’’.
Subjects participating in experiments in DeSciL have the right
of voluntary participation (p.4):‘‘ Every laboratory participant has
the right to terminate their involvement in research at any time for
any reason. If a research participant chooses to exercise this right,
they are still entitled to receive their show-up payment, although
additional potential earnings are relinquished. There shall be no
penalty levied against a participant who chooses to terminate their
research participation’’.
It is optional in DeSciL to provide written or verbal informed
consent. This is stated in the Operational Rules as follows (p.4):‘‘It
is optional that research participants complete a consent form
before participating in a research session. A typical consent form
contains: the name of the research session, including the time and
date; verification that the participant is in the laboratory of their
own volition; a claim of understanding of the basic rights as a
research participant, including the right to terminate research
participation at any time for any reason; contact information for
the responsible researchers should the participant have follow up
questions or concerns’’. Since all procedures adhered to the
Operational Rules of DeSciL and since these are publicly
available, it was deemed unnecessary that participants complete
a consent form before participating in the experiment. The
Operational Rules include all necessary information such as no
deception, incentive compatible decisions, and participants’ rights
to terminate the experiment at any time.
Anonymity of subjects’ decisions and confidentiality was
guaranteed and is stated in the Operational Rules as follows (p.4
f.): ‘‘The confidentiality of participants will be guaranteed before
the research session, during the research activities, during the
payment process, and after the completion of the research
activities’’.
The review committee of DeSciL is called ‘‘Review Board’’,
whose members are listed on the DeSciL website (http://www.
descil.ethz.ch/people). All experiments in DeSciL are under the
supervision of the Review Board. The Review Board granted me a
waiver to perform this research without specific ethical approval.
All information provided during the experiment is given in the
Supporting Information. All subjects received paper instructions in
German about the procedures and payments at their individual
booths. The English translation of these instructions is given in
Figure S1. Figures S2–S4 show screenshots of the computer
interface of all experimental treatments, including written
instructions and input windows.
The research reported in this paper took place exclusively in
Switzerland, the country of my university affiliations. All the
research was performed in the DeSciL laboratory at ETH Zurich,
Haldeneggsteig 4, CH-8092 Zurich.
Supporting Information
Figures S1–S6 and Tables S1–S2, including paper instructions
in all experimental treatments, screenshots of computer interfaces
of dice reports, belief elicitations and information feedback, trends
of reported payment claims in means and fives with 99.9%
confidence intervals, groups sizes of under- and overestimators,
payments for belief accuracy and linear regression models of
treatment differences in reported means and fives.
Data is available on request from the corresponding author.
Supporting Information
Figure S1 Paper instructions in all experimental treat-
ments (English translation).
(PDF)
Figure S2 Computer interface for elicitation of payment
claims in all treatments. (Instructions are translated into
English, text with arrows give translations for parts of the
computer screen).
(PDF)
Figure S3 Computer interface for belief elicitation in
info and belief control treatments. (Instructions are
translated into English, text with arrows give translations for parts
of the computer screen).
(PDF)
Figure S4 Computer interface of information feedback
in info treatment. (Instructions are translated into English, text
with arrows give translations for parts of the computer screen).
(PDF)
Figure S5 Trend of reported payment claims in means
(panel A) and fives (panel B) with 99.9% error bars. All
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error bars do not overlap with respective honesty thresholds,
showing highly significant lying in all treatments at all periods.
(PDF)
Figure S6 Group sizes of under- and overestimators
over periods. Panel A displays the fraction of underestimators of
reported means and panel B, of reported fives. Error bars show
adjusted 95% confidence intervals such that non-overlapping
intervals refer to treatment differences with p#5% (see the section
Materials and Methods for calculations of adjustments). Under-
estimators hold beliefs below reported payment claims in their
group at respective periods.
(PDF)
Table S1 Payoffs for accuracy in beliefs in treatment 1
in Swiss Rappen (1 CHF=100 Rappen).
(PDF)
Table S2 Linear regression models of treatment differ-
ences in reported means (models 1–2) and fives (models
3–4), referring to average effects for all types. Models 1
and 3 show differences between info and control belief treatments
and models 2 and 4 between info and control base treatments.
Only periods 2, 3 and 4 are used, because these are the periods
after information feedback in the info treatment.
(PDF)
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1
Fig S1. Paper instructions in all experimental treatments (english translation).
  
Institute of Sociology, University of Zurich  D-Gess | Chair of Sociology 
Procedure of the study 
You find a die at your place. In what follows, you are asked to cast the die 12 times and to 
fill in all of your scored points into the computer interface. Your entries are completely 
anonymous. Your die casts can neither be observed by other participants nor by the 
experimenter. Therefore, it is neither possible during the experiment, nor when payments are 
cashed nor in retrospect to determine your actual die casts or actual die casts of other 
participants.  
Your payments in Swiss Francs (CHF) are calculated according to the table below. 
 Casted number 6 1 2 3 4 5 
Payment in CHF 0.00 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 
Please notice that the casted number “six” yields no payment. As you will have realized, the 
average payment for a large number of die casts is 2.5 CHF per cast (0+1+2+3+4+5)/6 = 2.5 
CHF.  
One of your die casts is selected randomly for payments in cash. The other 11 die casts 
are not paid out. During the study, you will run through several rounds; in all of which one 
die cast is paid out in cash.  
Please do not start until you are called upon. After you have finished your required twelve 
die casts, you are allowed to cast additional casts to verify that the die is working properly. 
However, only your first 12 casts count.  
During the complete study, you are member of a group of 10 participants altogether. All 
the other 9 participants have received the same instructions as you did and are also required 
to cast 12 times. For everybody, one die cast is randomly selected for payment in cash.  
You will run through one trial round, in which you can familiarize yourself with the 
procedure of the experiment. The trial round has absolutely no effect on your payments. All 
10 participants of your group run through the trial round. The main study starts after you 
and all other members of your group have concluded the trial round. In the main study, your 
entries are relevant for payments.  
Please press the continue button as soon as you have finished reading and have no further 
questions. If you have questions, you can raise your hand. We will come to your place and 
answer your questions. The experiment starts as soon as all members of your group have 
pressed the continue button.  
Fig S2. Computer interface for elicitation of payment claims in all treatments.
(Instructions are translated into English, text with arrows give translations for parts of
the computer screen.)
This is the start of the main study. From now on, your entries are 
payment relevant. One of your die casts will be randomly 
selected for payments in cash. 
Please cast 12 times your die and fill in your scored points 
into the following table. 
casted number
payment
cast 1
cast 2
cast 3
cast 4
cast 5
cast 6
cast 7
cast 8
cast 9
cast 10
cast 11
cast 12
continue
Fig S3. Computer interface for belief elicitation in info and belief control treatments.
(Instructions are translated into English, text with arrows give translations for parts of
the computer screen.)
Please estimate the reported payments of the other 9 participants of your group. For this 
purpose, enter the frequencies of claimed payments in the table below. Take into consideration 
that you have to estimate the distribution of a total of 108 die casts: because each of the 9 
participants report 12 die casts, the total number of reported die casts is 9 * 12 = 108. 
As you will have realized, the average frequency for each reported payment claim is 18 for a 
large number of die casts: 1/6 x 12 casts x 9 participants = 18. 
You receive additional money for the accuracy of your estimates: the better your estimates, the
more money. You are paid separately for each of your 6 estimates, that is, you are paid for your 
estimate of the frequency of reported 0 CHF, 1 CHF, 2 CHF, 3 CHF, 4 CHF and 5 CHF. You are paid 
0.80 CHF for a correct value. You are paid 0.75 CHF for a deviation of 1 from the correct value. 
For a deviation of 2, you are paid 0.60 CHF, for a deviation of 3, you are paid 0.35 CHF and you
are paid nothing for larger deviations. 
reported cast frequency
total 
number
continue
frequency
Fig S4. Computer interface of information feedback in info treatment. (Instructions
are translated into English, text with arrows give translations for parts of the computer
screen.)
The following figure shows your estimates 
in comparison to the actual values.
frequency
your estimates
frequency
actual values
Your receive 1.15 CHF 
for your estimates.
continue
Fig S5. Trend of reported payment claims in means (panel A) and fives (panel B)
with 99.9% error bars. All error bars do not overlap with respective honesty thresholds,
showing highly significant lying in all treatments at all periods.
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Fig S6. Group sizes of under- and overestimators over periods. Panel A displays the
fraction of underestimators of reported means and panel B, of reported fives. Error
bars show adjusted 95% confidence intervals such that non–overlapping intervals refer
to treatment differences with p ≤ 5% (see SM for calculations of adjustments). Un-
derestimators hold beliefs below reported payment claims in their group at respective
periods.
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Table S1. Payoffs for accuracy in beliefs in treatment 1 in Swiss Rappen (1 CHF = 100
Rappen).
Difference belief and real frequency of reported payoff 0 1 2 3 ≥ 4
CHF 0.80 0.75 0.60 0.35 0
Table S2. Linear regression models of treatment differences in reported means (models
1–2) and fives (models 3–4), referring to average effects for all types. Models 1 and 3
show differences between info and control belief treatments and models 2 and 4 between
info and control base treatments. Only periods 2, 3 and 4 are used, because these are
the periods after information feedback in the info treatment.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
mean mean fives fives
(control belief) (control base) (control belief) (control base)
info 0.142 0.0965 0.371 0.146
(1.06) (0.71) (0.69) (0.27)
intercept 3.282∗∗∗ 3.328∗∗∗ 4.104∗∗∗ 4.329∗∗∗
(34.08) (33.79) (10.85) (11.33)
N 480 480 480 480
t statistics in parentheses, robust s.e. clustered for subjects, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
